In analysing · women's economic role in a recession
Introduction
The characterisation of women as a reserve army of labour has gained wide currency among feminists and writers of the Left.
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Proponents of this view argue that women, particularly those who are married, have been used as a convenient reserve of labour to be drawn into the workforce during an expansionary stage of an economic cycle, and to be disposed of when production contracts. For example, Owen (1978, p.26) , has written that Women have long been regarded as a reserve army which can be called upon in times of war or when a shortage of male labour threatens to push up rates of pay -and then relegated to unpaid domestic labour when the economy requir, es it.
Similarly, Adamson et al. {1976, p.l6 ) maintain that women exist for capital, as a cheap, unorganised source of labour. They can be called upon to augment the industrial reserve army, available to be drawn into or thrown out of employment according to the needs of capital accumulation at any particular time ... They are available at home to be drawn into production when necessary and can be thrown back into the home when accumulation stagnates. Milkman (1976) and Gardiner (1975 Gardiner ( -1976 , on the other hand, reject the view that women, as a distinct social ,grouping, can be discharged from employment during economic crises. Milkman (1976, p. 75) has argued that although the reserve army concept is useful for analysing the entrance of women into the paid workforce over the long-teint, it does not "tell us very much about thẽir economic roles in a period of crisis". She points out that since the sexual division of labour among occupations creates an inflexibility in the 1 58 Roberta Hill structure of the labour market, women cannot be expeJled from the workforce in the manner suggested by the theory. She goes on to argue instead (Millanan, 1976, p.7S) that in an economic crisis it might be women's work in the home, rather than their labourmarket participation, which is "forced to take up the slack". In analysing women's employment in Britain between 1966 and 1974 , Gardiner ( 1975 -1976 found that the proportion of women among total employees actually rose during this period of economic contraction, and that women who were discharged from employment in manufacturing were being absorbed into the services sector rather than leaving the workforce altogether. She concludes, therefore, that in these years, women did.not act as an industrial reserve army .. 2 More recently, Anthias (1980) discounts the explanatory potential of the classical form of the reserve army theory when applied to women's employment. She argues (1980, p.SO) among other things, that the concept refers to the role of "unemployment" within the abstract capitalist mode, whereas the main problematic concerning women's employment is its increase and the particular fortns that it takes.
The problem with both the proponents and the critics of the concept in its application to women is that, since they tend to focus on only one of the different senses in which Marx used it, they fail to identify all the functions which a reserve army fulfds. Female unemployment is seen only in terms of a total discharge from the workforce, and the emphasis on job insecurity obscures the importance of the reserve artny as a force which depresses wage-levels during economic recession. Those writers who have discussed women's role in keeping wages down have tended to concentrate on the contribution made by their domestic rather than their wage labour.
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For these different reasons, analyses and criticisms of the concept in its application to women's employment have at best been only partial.
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Marx's Use of the Term
Marx {1975, pp. 628-645) employed the concept of an "industrial reserve arnty" in Capital to show how labour was used in the process of capital accumulation. However, his analysis was not worked out in detail, and he never clearly distinguished the different senses in which he used the tenn.
In the fust place, he spoke of different types of active reserve army labour required for capital accumulation. One group of these comprised floating workers who would move from job to job as labour was used and discarded by different capitals. The other, llltent workers, were drawn into employment when an absolute increase in the size of the working population was required for expanding industries or for new branches of production.
Secondly, Marx used the concept to describe the forJJ1s of labour generated, or made unemployed, by the process of capital accumulation. These were the floating, latent and stagnant pools of unemployed. The floating pool was created in the urban centres of industry when technological developments replaced labour with new machines. The latent pool, Marx argued, was the result of the introduction of capitalist technology into agricultural production in the rural areas. Subsistence producers in these areas for1ned a latent pool, because unlike the floating workers, they could not be immediately absorbed into capitalist production, although their decreasing ability to subsist on the land made them potentially easy to absorb should capital require them. The stagnant pool became unemployed for very long periods, and was generated by the periodic long-te11D tendency for the rate of profit to fall. In the fint section of the paper, the New Zealand clothing industry and the worJdnas of the bonus system within clothing factories, are briefly It is argued that, .,. .... -i . . periods of high unemployment, the existence of a pool of unemployed feJJlale wodcea tends to facilitate employers' attempts, using the bonus system, to intensify work 9 to counter declining profitability. The next section gives examples of other strategies, also based on the bonus system, which are used during economic crisis to cut the real wages of staff and lay off the least productive workers 1 0 without provokina effective uninn action. The concluding section shows that, while all employees are vulnerable to sudl strategies, female workers tend to c01nply with methods for achieving goals which are less likely to be tolerated by men.
It is the argument of this paper that, although the particular strategies used by e1nployers to maximise profitability are probably peculiar to the clothing industry, a similar process of work intensification and cost cutting could occur when semi-skilled female workers are employed in other industries with declining profits.
The New 1be clothing industry in New Zealand has a predominantly female workforce. In moat factories and work-rooms the manager is a male, and men are more likely to work as deaipers, pressen, cutten and warehouse assistants, but the machinists, supeniaon and examinen are almost always women. For example, at the time of the study, about 85% of the Canterbury (etc.) Clothing Worken Union were women, and only two of the 3,000 members were male machinists. Commenting that the sectors of industry involved are often vulnerable to competition, she cites g&11nent manufacture as one example. According to Butterworth, the small-unit enterprises of such industries "are under-capitalised, and have perennial cash-flow problems" (1978, p.ll) . .
The work process in the clothing industry varies according to the nature of the product and the level of technology employed In the large factories with modem technology, the production process is divided into numerous separate operations. Each operation is perfoiJned by different machinists using a variety of machines. For example, one Christchurch clothing factory which manufactures jeans has 28 different machines for 38 stages of the work process. One of these machines is a "bar tacker". The woman who operates it will attach five belt loops to each pair of partly-completed jeans with a bar tack (or small row of stitching) at the top and bottom to foiJil and hold the loop. At the same time, she will sew two bar tacks at the bottom of the fly of the jeans and one on each comer of the four pockets -20 bar tacks in an. That operation will be repeated dally by the same machinist on hundreds of pairs of jeans. This work is referred to in the clotbing trade as "production" or "piece work".
• The medium-sized factories which make a variety of men's or women's clothes may divide up the work process so that the younger and inexperienced machinists are assigned to piece work. They will, for example, sew the fob pockets of men's trousers and shorts, as well as belts or collars for blouses and dresses. These pieces will then be attached to the garment by the experienced machinists, who are responsible for joining up the main pieces. Clothing workers refer to this as "making the whole garment". This work is done by safety-stitch machinists, overlockers or straight sewers. The work might then be finished off by a machinist operating a blind hemmer. Work on the hemmer is again considered piece work.
In the smallest factories or work-rooms, which tend to manufacture higher-priced "quality" clothes, machinists are usually responsible for making up virtually the entire gaintent. Typically, the workplace is a fashion boutique or small tailoring firm.
A machinist making the whole gaatnent, such as a woman's coat or man's suit, performs skilled work requiring several years' training and work experience. However, the demand for such skill declines as the production process is divided up, or "de-skilled". Many machinists in the jeans facto!)', for example, needed only to hold the fabric against a metal guide, move a lever by knee, foot or hand, and the machine automatically completed the appropriate operation.
The Bonus System
The clothing trade is labour-intensive, technologically "backward", and vulnerable to competition. Although some productivity gains can be made by investment in technology, . competition among fmns depends heavily on intensifying the labour process and lowering labour costs. Therefore fa11ing profitability can be countered, in the short te1n1, fust, by increasing the intensity of work which raises output per hour. Strategies to achieve this include ( 1) basing wages on output (or piece-wages) and (2) strict supervision and discipline. Second, wage costs can be cut by resisting wage demands and by laying-off the least productive workers. The· greatest potential for pursuing these strategies in the clothing industry lies in the bonus system. The amount of work and the time taken by each machinist is monitored weekly, ostensibly in order to calculate bonuses, but its effect is also to intensify the pressure to raise output. The actual details of how work-output is recorded varies from factory to factory.
Typically, the women themselves note the price they are given when they are allocated a particular bundle of work. They divide their minimum weekly wage by five. This daily wage is then divided by the price given each particular piece in the bundle. From this the women can determine the number of pockets, belts or gannents they are required to produce in eight hours to make the day's wage. The same principle applies when the calculation is based on time rather than on price. At the end of the day, the supervisor or boss also checks the work done by each machinist, and a record is kept for comparison. At the end of the week, machinists and management have a record of the amount of work that each woman has done, calculated in terms of the weekly wage. If a machinist makes $20 over her wage, for example, she will be paid a $20 bonus. If she is $20 down, she must still be paid the award rate, but this "failure" has important implications as a potential means of increasing work speed. · First, to make their wages, machinists must work at a pace determined by the time or prices set by management, and most of the women seemed to accept them as a norm for "doing a fair day's work". Second, because the women's work is recorded, a boss or supervisor knows when any machinist is down on her wages. Being told that she is so many dollars down makes a machinist feel uncomfortable, guilty or resentful. She will try to avoid being placed in such a position again, and will attempt to increase her speed to . complete the required output. Carters Clothing Factory, for example, made its machinists record the work they did each day in notebooks which were collected once a week. The following conversation with Judy illustrates how the notebook system worked.
There was the big worry on the Tuesday. They used to collect your books in and if you didn't make your time they used to come out and give you a little talking to. Q. Did they? A. .Well, if you were too far down (PAUSE) see they would work it out, if you were $10 down they'd write it "Minus $10". Mn Carter would write it in. And they would not write when you made a bonus ... 
Q. What did it make you feel like?
A. Very guilty, because you see they were paying you a full wage whether. you were $20 down, and they paid you that, and they obviously made you feel it by putting this in your book.
Later in ·the interview Judy r~ferred again to the notebooks:
Those books they kept. It was so tight the system there. They would count (PAUSE) you'd write it in your book, then they would count it, almost calling you a liar, then would write it down them~elves and check that off with the other. one. They had a big card on the office wall on who made it [their wage 1 aftd who didn't make it. We weren't never allowed to see it, though when you went in the office the odd time you used to see it. They used to check up on A. Yes, I think it did,.and they had all this worry of the place faJJ;ng through, and probably the gn-ls suffered at their expense, but (PAUSE). Q. What, they started to (PAUSE)? A. Yes, put the screws on us and all that sort of thing. Before Christmas it started.
Q. Were you ever aware that they cut your times? A. Oh yes, they did, but where we couldn't do anything about it was they changed the style a bit. To do mohair coats, $1.69. Sometime after that we did a coat, $1.40 something, only changed in the s1ightest way, and the price was lower, but we couldn't do a thing about that because that was a new style. It might have been a different pocket, (PAUSE) Q. And the coat would take the same amount of time? A. More or less the same sort of coat but just changed a little bit.
I
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The following comment from Caroline also suggests the extent of the intensification of work in the factory at that time. Jennifer, the machinist to whom Caroline refers, was one of the fastest at Carters. (During her interview she -had spoken of "nearly doubling her wages" on one or two occasions.)
All the old prices, every time we got a wage rise, they'd be stepped up so much percent. The things they'd been doing for years had a really good price on them. But as it g9t to the end the prices got lower and lower and it got harder and harder to make your wages, and even Jennifer sometimes couldn't make her wages, and sometimes you'd be $20 down . , .
Similar pressures to increase work output were employed in other fums in financial difficulties. Sandra, for example, prefaced her answer to a question about what she had done in her second job with the comment, "It was a leather place. They've gone down" (she meant the work-room had closed since she was working there). When asked why she had left, ·she replied:
They made you work really fast. You had to do your work and that was it. Times [set by the boss] were hard. It was difficult.
Using the fastest machinist as a basis for setting times was the second way in which the pace of work could be intensified. Three of the women volunteered information about this. As Cheryl explained it, all you needed was one person able to make the time and the union couldn't do a thing about it ... I've talked to girls at other places and a lot of them comment how it's not fair that they take the times from the fastest machinist or one of the fastest there.
Then she added, matter-of-factly, "well, they're going to make their money if they can get everyone up to that standard."
The third strategy for manipulating times was to cut the hours of work while still expecting the machinists to produce the same output. Here I .isa is speaking about Trim wear Garments, a Christchurch clothing factocy of similar sire to Carters.
He [the manager] cut our hours down and expected us to do 40 hours' work when we were only getting paid for 36 hours, and some of the girls (PAUSE) well I could get nearly half of it out. I got my wage out but he expected us to get ~ bonus out and we couldn't, we just couldn't, not with 36 hours; and we had to do 14 coats a day. In one part we had to do 24 . • I reckon I should have got more money because you were getting pushed, and you were working as hard as you could to get their wage. Even if you went to the toilet the boss always had his eye on you to see how many times you went to the toilet, and I reckoned that was silly. Q. Do you really think he watched how many times you went to the toilet? A. He even told me. He come up to me and quite a few girls when we first started there, and he says "Don't go to the toilet too much." He says "You're only allowed to go in your breaks." That was his way. Before you started work you had to go, then you had to go at morning tea, your lunch hour. Even though you didn't want to go you had to go. He says to me, "I watched one girl just yesterday and she went to the toilet eight times."
This is how Caroline spoke of the boss at Charltons, a small suburban clothing factory with a staff of 15. (At one stage later in the interview, she had commented, "of course, he was all going bankrupt. I think he's still going [in business], but he's still going bankrupt.") She had just been asked what her fifth job had been. She named the factory, and went on, Reducing Wage Costs I have argued that funts with declining profits may attempt to stave off bankruptcy by intensifying work using a variety of different strategies on the bonus system. Firms can also employ a number of methods to reduce wage costs. The interview data suggest that in a recession the wages of existing staff can sometimes be cut, and the least productive workers laid off, without always provoking effective counteraction by the • unton.
• t ( 1be 8nt method relates to the payment of S4 weekly 11 the job, Jennifer had been told that this was paid to an thole evmy day on time for work, and took no time off during that week.
cow,ed that she was not going to be paid thJs money, the and new worken would not receive it. In her sewnth week repreeentative had a discussion with about half of the staff. It was, only the ones who got [attendance money] and I thou-i)lt everyone got it. Wen, the boss had put a plea across to the workers that ''Mitchell's isn't doiq so weD at the moment and things are tough in the clothing trade, and women are getting made redundant, and would those who get attenda. nce money, would you put up your hands and volunteer to give it up?" So what did they do? They all put their hands up except for two women. So, because those two women didn't the union was called in. And did he do his nut: the union blo e .
[Contrary to what the boss had said 1 he said the firm we were worldns for wu one of the safest jobs around because we have export, and the govemmeat subsidises them. So they had a secret ballot. Only those who got atteDdauce money. They all decided they didn't want to give [it] up .
• In this instance union action WtlS effective in preventing a wage cut.
The second method concerns a seven percent cost-of-liYing adjustment to waaes. A dispute arose over the basis on which part-time worken were to be paid
The seven percent went to all workers on the tint S 100 of their wage. at tbat stage were earning just over $100 gross, and received the full $7. The d at Mitchell's, however, paid part-time worken 7 percent on their wefklY wage of $88, but were not pmpared to adjust their bonus earnings over that •mount. 1be women voted on the issue. Twelve were against the payment for the part-time11, 34 were for · • There wu a meeting between the b011 and the women, Jennifer IBid.
The boss said ''those girls who were full-time that had nothing to do with (the part-time workeD). Why were they backing the others?" He aot reaU.y (PAUSE) That's the only way I can explain it. They were just scared because that's a man ta1Jdng over them. He's the boas and he's got the MY.
Well, it's not always that way. But they just cannot see it. See, like when the union was there, one puticwar lady was agreeing with the union so much, then when the boss was talking she'd be asreeins with the boss. You know. And that just doeat 't go down with me. They're just too scared to back each other.
• I have shown from the interview data three ways in which wages could be cut when fuiJts are seeking to reduce labour costs. AI already pointed out, the union can intervene when times are directly cutin the ume way, if women are fired, they haw a right to claim reinstatement, and the union can be ca11ed in. Furthennore, if retrenchment is necessary, then redundancy payments may have to be paid to those who ue laid off. In practice, however, it seems that staff DIJmbers can sometimes be reduced and both these consequences avoided.
• During a recession when times or prices are manipulated, only the fastest machinists will be able to make their wages. The dower ones will be consistently down each week. A boss or supervisor can. then "legitimately" claim that the slow machtn;st is not her wages and must go.
As I have shown earlier, mnce women tend to the times u a norm for a fair day's wage, if they are down on their wages they feel guilty and worry about their failure. This feeling is heightened by remarks that are made to them about being "so many dollan down". Those who are fued are then unlikely to go to the union, even if they consider their dismisul unfair, because being fired is putly seen as a personal failure.
Two of the machinists had been fired from jobs they went into on leaving Carters. Naomi was told to leave Trimweu's after one week. The way she described being sacked shows how readily she submitted to although she obviously coDiidered she had been treated unfairly. She had just explaJned that the boa had come to her before work ended on Friday.
The way he went about it, living you the sack! I mean, they could have given you a week's notice, or said, if you don't pick up in a week I'm afraid we'll have to let you go. But to give you two minutes' notice. That wu a bit lousy that. It's just that I wasn't fast enough. Jeanette Naomi went on to say that other worken had told her quite a bit about the place • For Naomi, having a husband to support her was clearly also a factor in her compliance. She did not seek work again for over two months.
Robyn complied in a similar way. The following conversation with her also summarises reasons why women might submit more readily than men to lay-offs or firing. When she was fired in June from a clothing factory after four weeks' work Robyn was pregnant and knew she would be fmishing anyway in December. In the interview she had just been asked if she had contacted the union after being laid off.
If I wasn't pregnant and I knew that I had to keep working for a period of time I would have thought about it, cos that's different (PAUSE). I mean, there are not that many clothing places left [because of factories closing] and it makes you think twice.
Like Naomi, Robyn was too slow, but, she explained, she "went slow at first to do a neat job. In a new job, you are slower, but you know you're going to speed up." She said that the factory "just wanted extra hard workers". She spoke of talks from the boss in which he said that "people have got to pull their weight on the machines (PAUSE) to keep the place going, cos sales are harder", and then commented, But rm a hard worker anyway. I used to work quite hard. I really tried, and my work's not scruffy. I just couldn't keep up with the (PAUSE) I couldn't produce what they wanted me individually to do.
At another stage in the interview she referred back to that job.
They didn't give me a chance. l 'hey said, if you don't get your time up you have to go. I more or less got told to go. I said, "I'll go anyway." That was embarrassing that part ... His wife (who worked in the office] said, "Oh you've been good here, but you're not quite up to our standard." So I said, oh well, I'll make it easier, so I'll just leave, and that was that.
Conclusion
In the preceding discussion I have shown different ways in which limits to the bonus system can be stretched or overcome during a recession in the clothing industry. The discussion reveals the complex processes that appear to lie behind women's lack of resistance to mechanisms for intensifying work and cutting wage costs. Based on the interview data, it seems that women tend to comply with these mechanisms for either one, but more usually a combination, of four main reasons:
First, the existence of a labour reserve means women cannot readily find new jobs should they leave their present ones, and their fear is that they "will be sent down the road" if they resist management's demands. This is why they tend not to raise with their union such matters as time-cuts, excessive work discipline, or wage-cuts.
• Second, women are accustomed to complying with authority, male authority. 1 5 At the same time, male employers are accustomed, in their domestic role u husbands, to exercising authority over women. SiDce women tend also to lack confidence and are unsure of their abilities, they ue vulnerable to sugestions that their work is too slow.
• Third, production under a bonus system tends to divide memben of the female workforce against one another. This hinders them in developing any common interest they have as workers, and makes it hard for them to stick together on issues that individuals raise with the union.
Fourth, women in peintanent relationships typically see their primary role as working in the home and caring for children, and this sexual division of labour can provide them with fmancial support from their husbands. Women might therefore submit more readily to wage-cuts and lay-offs when they define themselves as a "second-income earner", or when lay-offs occur early in pregnancy or coincide with the stage when they intended "to start a famlly".
There are a number of problems associated with using the reserve army of labour thesis to analyse women's employment, particularly during a ·recession. One major problem centres on the idea, suggested by the theory, that women (particularly 11111rried women) can be brought into the workforce and dispensed with as conditions of production change. A serious objection to this conceptualisation is that there is a sexual division of labour among occupations which creates an inflexibility in the labour market.
The argument of this paper has focused, instead, on what happens to the nature of the work women do in a recession when they face competition from a female labour reserve for a reduced number of jobs. It suggests that working women may intensify their workeffort and submit to wage-cuts because such management strategies can be pursued most successfully with a female workforce when unemployment is high.
I have illustrated the argument with reference to the particular work experiences of the 22 clothing workers studied. These illustrations reveal the pressures on women to comply. The argument does not preclude the possibility of women in the clothing industry developing effective worker organisation and taking collective action when they see their livelihood threatened. The Rixen clothing workers' protracted sit-in is an obvious example. Given the nature of the pressures faced by the women in the study however, research is needed to determine under what conditions women in such industries will be able, or prepared, to confront male employers in their collective interest.
